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Abstract 
    We integrated accounting, corporate governance, and macroeconomic variables 
to build up a binary logistic regression model for the prediction of financially 
distressed firms. Debt ratio and ROA are found to be the most explanatory accounting 
variables while the percentage of directors controlled by the largest shareholder 
(which measures negative entrenchment effect), management participation, and the 
percentage of shares pledged for loans by large shareholders are shown to have 
positive contribution to the probability of financial distress. For macroeconomic 
sensitivities, firms with higher sensitivities to the annualized growth rates of 
manufacturing production index and money supply (M2) are more vulnerable to 
financial distress. 
    As to the issue of sampling technique, we find that oversampling of distressed 
firms is subject to the problem of choice-based sample bias pointed out by Zmijewski 
(1984). The classification accuracy is overstated consequently. We try to include as 
many healthy firms as possible in our sample instead of following the traditional 1: 1 
or 1: 2 matching principle. The results show that the classification accuracy is mostly 
significantly improved in our integrated prediction model when the sample is closest 
to the actual population. 
    For the trade-off between type I and type II errors in the predicted probability 
classification, we maximize the sum of classification accuracy for both groups of 
firms (the healthy and the distressed). It is found that an estimated probability of 
financial distress of 0.2000 represents the optimal cutoff point for predicting financial 
distress. Under such a cutoff scheme, our integrated model produces an in-sample 
classification accuracy of 80.7% for distressed firms and 93.2% for healthy firms. For 
out-sample prediction, 90% of the distressed firms and 85.4% healthy firms in 2001 
are correctly identified using an integrated model built upon samples from 1998 to 
2000. 
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    Financial accounting information has long been widely used in explaining the 
possibility of corporate financial failures. Beaver (1966), Altman (1968) and Ohlson 
(1980), among others, are the mostly cited examples. However, financial data are ex 
post in nature, in the sense that audited annual statements are not released until next 
year. Furthermore, earnings management may create misleading information which, 
in most cases, exaggerates profitability to a certain degree
1. It is therefore logical to 
search for more information other than accounting data when building early warning 
systems for financial distress. 
    Several researches point to the weakness in corporate governance as one of the 
major causes for Asian Financial Crisis that occurred in 1997
2. For example, Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) and Prowse (1998) conclude that poor corporate governance on 
top of concentrated ownership structure paved the way to the Crisis. Johnson, Boone, 
Breach and Friedman (2000) find that in a poor corporate governance environment, 
agency problem tends to be more serious especially facing economic downturns. Thus 
both stock and currency markets are more vulnerable to unfavorable economic 
situation.  
    These  literatures  are  mostly  macro-empirical in nature, which investigate sample 
countries as a whole. Yet even in a country that runs into financial turmoil, there are 
still profitable firms that survive the crisis. Further micro-research based on individual 
firms, therefore, would help to generate more insights. 
    Under concentrated ownership structure, the hypothesis of convergence of 
                                                 
1  Schipper (1989), Healy and Wahlen (1999) as well as Dechow and Skinner (2000) provide excellent 
review on earnings management. 
2 World Bank (1998) urged East Asian countries to strengthen corporate governance mechanism, such 
as investors protection, information transparency and stricter regulation on insiders trading. 
  1interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) predicts that positive incentive effects are 
driven by high ownership of the controlling shareholder (Claessens, et al, 2002). On 
the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), La Porta et al. (1999) argue that conflicts 
of interests may exist between the controlling shareholder and small investors, which 
results in wealth expropriation. This leads to the hypothesis of negative entrenchment 
effects. 
    Pyramid ownership structure
3 and cross-shareholding are often employed to 
widen the gap between cash flow rights and voting rights. Claessens et al. (2002), La 
Porta et al. (2002), Lemman and Lins (2001) further provide evidence for the positive 
relationship between corporate value and investor protection are well as cash flow 
rights of the controlling shareholder, and for the negative relationship between 
corporate value and the discrepancy between cash flow rights and control rights.   
    Several types of behavior are characterized by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (2000) and Johnson et al. (2000)
4 to have adverse effects on 
corporate values and financial performances. However, to prolong the wealth 
expropriation, the controlling shareholders may not like to see their firms fall into 
bankruptcy as pointed out by Claessens, Djankov and Klapper (1999). This extra 
defense against financial distress is again carried out at the expense of the small 
shareholders. Thus even though we have strong evidence to support the negative 
association between corporate value and corporate governance, whether more 
likelihood of financial distress will follow remains an open question. 
                                                 
3 Pyramid structure refers to an ownership structure where multilayer control chains are created to 
enhance the controlling power. Cross-shareholding refers to a situation where firms hold shares of one 
another to entrench the control. 
4 Aside from direct embezzlement, other possible expropriation include the sale of assets, products or 
securities to another entity that the controlling shareholder owns at below-market price, the transfer or 
technologies to a third party without royalty payment, etc. Although these arrangements usually appear 
perfectly legal, their net effect may be as large as or even larger than direct embezzlements. 
  2    To solve or to clarify the puzzle, corporate governance variables such as cash 
flow rights, gap between control and cash flow rights, percentage of board members 
occupied by the controlling shareholders and percentage of shares pledged for bank 
loans by the controlling shareholders are chosen to measure the quality of corporate 
governance. 
    Rose, Andrews and Giroux (1982) advocate the inclusion of macroeconomic 
variable into early warning systems to increase the prediction power
5. Tirapat and 
Nittayagasetwat (1999) include economic sensitivity of individual firms in addition to 
financial variables to build a macro-related micro-crisis investigation model through 
logit regression. They find macroeconomic sensitivity of firms represents a key set of 
indicators of financial difficulties. Deteriorating macroeconomic environment 
increases the systematic risk of all firms, but firms with higher sensitivity to 
macroeconomic volatility tend to be more vulnerable to financial distress. Thus 
several measures of firms’ sensitivity to macroeconomic situation are incorporated 
into our model. 
        In sum, the purposes of the paper are: 
1.  to search for variables that are capable of explaining corporate financial 
failures; 
2.  to build a financial distress prediction model that integrates accounting, 
corporate governance and macroeconomic sensitivities; 
3.  to investigate the effects that over-sampling financial distressed firms has on 
the percentage of correct classification. 
                                                 
5 They find nine macroeconomic indicators to be highly correlated with the likelihood of corporate 
financial failures, namely, Dow Jones Industrial Average Index, unemployment rate, market-wide 
profitability, coupon rate of AAA-rated bonds, gross savings rate, changes in corporate investments, 
  3    The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our 
sample and the definitions of the operating variables. Section III introduces binary 
logistic regression model and summarizes the resulting empirical findings. We 
analyze the classification accuracy of our model and discuss the possible upward bias 
in classification accuracy due to choice-based sample bias of different 
sample-matching schemes in Section IV, followed by a brief conclusion in Section V. 
 
II.  Samples and Operating Variables 
1. The sample 
    When a listed company gets into financial distress, the trading of its shares is 
automatically changed into cash basis (with 100% margin requirement), or it may be 
subject to trading halt, or even get delisted by Taiwan stock Exchange. We search for 
financially distressed firms between 1998 and 2001 from the Central Communication 
Briefing System as well as other newspapers, and collect 57 firms that satisfy our 
definition of financial distress.   
    Matching samples or financially healthy firms are those which had been listed 
for at least five years before 1998, and had not been qualified as financially distressed 
firms defined by Whitaker (1999) and Hopwood et al. (1994)
6. In addition, financial 
industry as a whole is excluded from our sample due to their different financial and 
business nature. Those with insufficient data to compute ownership structure and 
board composition are also discarded. The final samples are summarized in Table1. 
                                                                                                                                            
averages output per hour, new orders on durable goods, and free reserves. 
6  Financial distress is defined as either (1) insufficient net operating cashflows to repay maturing debts 
and loss of corporate market value, or (2) the occurrence of at least three out of the following four types 
of events: negative operating cash flow in the current year; operating loss in any of the last three years; 
negative retained earnings in any of the last three years; net loss in any of the last three years. 
  4Table 1: The sample of financially distressed and healthy firms 
Number of Firms  Year 
Distressed Healthy 
Ratio of Distressed to 
healthy firms 
1998 15  94  0.160 
1999 17  99  0.172 
2000 15  125  0.120 
2001 10  137  0.073 
 57 455  0.125 
 
2. The Operating Variables 
    Our integrated prediction model incorporates three types of variables, namely, 
accounting information, corporate governance attributes and macroeconomic 
sensitivity. For the first two types of variables, we collect the related data for the year 
before the distress. Macroeconomic sensitivities are estimated using five-year stock 
returns and macroeconomic data prior to the distress. 
A. Accounting information 
    The most commonly used accounting information in the related literature is 
collected from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ). They include 
(1)  debt ratio＝total liabilities/total assets 
(2)  return on asset(ROA)  ＝EBIT/average assets 
(3)  Current ratio＝current assets/current liabilities 
(4)  Quick ratio＝quick assets/current liabilities 
(5)  Interest coverage ratio＝EBIT/interest expense 
(6)  Fixed ratio＝fixed assets/total assets 
(7)  Inventory turnover＝cost of goods sold/ average inventory 
(8)  A/R turnover＝sales/accounts receivables 
(9)  Total asset turnover＝sales/average assets 
(10) before tax profit margin＝  net income before tax/ net sales 
 
 
  5B. Macroeconomic sensitivities 
    We regress five-year monthly share returns against several macroeconomic 
variables with monthly data to obtain estimated sensitivities of stack returns to 
macroeconomic conditions. These estimated sensitivities are then incorporated into 
our prediction model, to be discussed later. Five macroeconomic variables are 
selected: (1) annualized growth rate of manufacturing production index (F1), (2) 
annualized growth rate of CPI (F2), (3) monthly changes in interest rate of 30-day 
commercial paper in the primary market (F3), (4) annualized growth rate of money 
supply (M2) (F4), and (5) the general scoring of economic situation (F5) provided by 
the Council of Economic Development. The higher the estimated sensitivities, the 
more vulnerable the company is to the changing economic environment, thus the 
more likely the company is going to get into financial distress facing worsening 
economic situation. 
C. Corporate governance variables 
    The concept of ultimate control proposed by La Porta et al. (1999) is applied to 
compute cash flow right and voting right. The voting right of the largest shareholder 
constrains both direct and indirect control rights. Direct control refers to the 
ownership registered under the shareholder’s own name while indirect control refers 
to the ownership registered under a third party which is in turn controlled by the same 
shareholder. Indirect control is usually achieved through cross-shareholding and/or 
pyramid ownership structure. If the largest shareholder is a family, then shares 
registered under the names of relatives, either by blood or marriage ties, to the second 
order are all included to compute the total voting rights. 
    For a multiple control chain structure, we follow the methodology employed by 
  6Claessens et al. (2000) and add up the minimum voting right along all control chains. 
On the other hand, cash flow right is the sum of the products of ownerships along all 
control chains. Voting rights, or control rights measures the degree of control of the 
largest shareholder over corporate decisions. Cash flow right, on the other hand, 
measures the share of profit or loss resulting from their decisions. 
    Figure 1 demonstrates the computation of voting right and cash flow right. 
Suppose family A owns 30% of the shares of company Z, which in turn owns 20% of 
company Y. In addition, family A also owns 40% of company X who is a 10% owner 
of company Y. Two control chains are involved in the pyramidal structure. By 
Claessens et al. (2000) definition, the control right of family A over company Y 
through company Z is the minimum of 30% and 20%, which is 20%, the control right 
through company X is the minimum of 40% and 10%. Summing up these two control 
rights, we have 30% of control rights over company Y by family A. 
        The cash flow rights of family A over company Y is 30%×20%=6% through the 
first chain, and 40%×10%=4% through the second chain. The total cash flow right 
comes to 10%. We see immediately the discrepancy of voting right away from cash 
flow right to be 30%-10%=20%.  This provides a measure of the possibility of 




Company Z Company X 
Company Y 
Figure 1: An example of pyramid structure and multiple control chains 
  7    Sometimes we find the intermediate companies are private companies whose 
ownership structures are not disclosed to the public. Under these circumstances, we 
first identify the control chain by looking at the representatives these intermediate 
companies send to the board of the controlled company. If the representatives belong 
to the family, the implicit control chain is confirmed. These information can be found 
from “The Research on Business Conglomerates in Taiwan” published by China 
Credit Corporation. The ownership of these intermediate companies over the sample 
companies can be collected from the prospectus of the target companies. 
    Although the above procedure enables us to identify the control chains, we still 
don’t know how much the largest shareholder owns the intermediate companies. We 
are therefore forced to make an assumption that these intermediate private companies 
are 100% owned by the largest shareholder and his affiliates. 
        For the composition of the board of directors and supervisors, we search through 
the identities of all board members, include representatives sent by institutionals. The 
percentage of board members affiliated to the controlling shareholder is then 
computed to measure the degree of control over the board of directors and 
supervisors. 
    We also collect the percentage of shares pledged for bank loans by the 
controlling shareholder and all board members. It is meaningful in the sense that the 
higher the pledge ratio, the lower the stake the controlling shareholder has on the 
target firms, and therefore the more likely they would do something harmful to the 
minority shareholders. In effect, it provides leverage over the cash flow right. 
    Two dummy variables are defined to measure management participation by the 
controlling shareholder and to identify the existence of a second largest shareholder. 
  8The management participation dummy takes the value of one if both chairman and 
CEO are affiliated with the controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. The second 
dummy variables takes the value of one if a second largest shareholder exists with at 
least 5% ownership, and zero otherwise.  It represents the existence of an outside 
monitoring function. 
 
III. Binary Logistic Regression Model and the Empirical Results 
    Binary Logistic Regression Model (BLRM) was first applied by Ohlson (1980) 
to predict corporate financial distress. It is superior to linear probabilistic model in the 
sense that it doesn’t require normality assumption and it guarantees the estimated 
probability to be between zero and one. Let Y measures the occurrence of financial 
distress. It takes the value of one if the sample firm falls into financial distress and 
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log                   ( 3 )  
    If the predicted probability of financial distress, , then firm i will be 
classified as a healthy firm, otherwise it will be classified as a financially distressed 
one. 
1 1 1 i i P P − <
1. The Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
    We first summarize the sample characteristics a year before the financial distress 
in Table 2. The results of tests on the differences in means of all three types of 
variables are also provided. 
Table 2：Basic statistics and tests of differences in means 
Variables  Type of firms mean  std. dev. t-stat  p-value 
A. Accounting variables 
healthy 39.42  13.70 
Debt ratio (%) 
distressed 61.11 19.29 
-10.71 0.000***
healthy 6.07 6.96 
ROA (%) 
distressed -6.94 18.92 
10.20 0.000***
Healthy   180.44  124.08 
Current ratio (%) 
distressed 117.68 119.94 
3.61 0.001***
Healthy 110.20 99.33 
Quick Ratio (%) 
distressed 50.99 75.85 
4.34 0.000***
healthy 7.48 9.97 
Inventory turnover 
distressed 4.60  4.84 
2.14 0.030**
healthy 8.64  11.45 
A/R turnover 
distressed 7.01  7.05 
1.04 0.293 
healthy 0.62 0.39 
Asset turnover 
distressed 0.52  0.35 
1.73 0.081* 
healthy 30.22  18.93 
Fixed asset ratio (%) 
distressed 32.50 20.81 
-0.84 0.390 
healthy 2.69  43.46  Before tax profit 
margin (%)  distressed –28.61 56.24 
4.94 0.000***
Interest coverage  healthy 216.05  2949.30 0.54 0.580 
  10(times)  distressed 1.61 33.52 
B. Macroeconomic sensitivities 
# 
healthy -0.05 0.29 
β1 
distressed 0.04  0.60 
-2.22 0.02** 
healthy -0.51 1.84 
β2 
distressed -0.10  1.74 
-1.60 0.10 
healthy 0.89  26 
β3 
distressed –0.53  4.77 
3.84 0.00***
healthy -0.16 1.46 
β4 
distressed 1.11  2.49 
-5.66 0.00***
healthy 0.26 0.56 
β5 




Table 2：Basic statistics and tests of differences in means (continued) 
Variables  Type of firms mean  std. dev. t-stat  p-value 
C. Corporate Governance 
healthy 23.53  14.08  Voting right of the 
largest shareholder (%)  distressed 20.94 12.19 
1.325 0.185 
healthy 14.92  10.74  Cash flow right of the 
largest shareholder (%)  distressed 14.16  8.96 
0.510 0.610 
healthy 8.61 9.69  Discrepancy of voting 
right and cash flow 
right  distressed 6.78  6.99 
1.380 0.168 
healthy 0.25 0.43  Existence of a second 
largest shareholder 
(dummy)  distressed 0.17  0.38 
1.346 0.178 
healthy 55.65  25.38  Directors controlled by 
the largest shareholder 
(%)  distressed 76.00 25.58 
-5.701 0.000***
healthy 51.30  39.85  Supervisors controlled 
by the largest 
shareholder (%)  distressed 75.07 38.07 
-4.265 0.000***
healthy 0.47 0.50  Management 
participation (dummy)  distressed 0.70  0.46 
-3.259 0.001***
healthy 25.91  27.46  Shares pledged for 
loans by large 
shareholders (%)  distressed 60.21 26.87 
-8.910 0.000***
*: significant at 10% , **: significant at 5% , ***: significant at 1% 
#: β1 through β5 are the sensitivity of monthly stock returns to annualized growth rate of manufacturing 
production index, annualized growth rate of CPI, monthly changes in 30-day interest rate of 
commercial paper, annualized growth rate of money supply (M2) and general scoring of economic 
situation.   
  11 
    For the year before the financial distress occurs, financially distressed firm and 
healthy firm have quite different financial ratios
7. For example, the average debt ratio 
for healthy firms is only 39%, compared with 61% for distressed firms. Average ROA 
for healthy firms and distressed firms are 6.1% and –6.9%, respectively. Average 
current (quick) ratio are 180% (110%) and 118% (51%) respectively. These 
differences are statistically significant at 1% level. 
    For all three turnover ratios, i.e., inventory turnover, A/R turnover and asset 
turnover, which represent the effectiveness of asset utilization, healthy firms again 
show better performance than distressed firms. However, the benchmark of operating 
leverage (i.e., fixed asset ratio) and cash flow coverage for interest expense are not 
significantly different between the two groups
8. 
    We see from Table 2, that healthy firms display more negative sensitivity to the 
annualized growth rate of manufacturing production index, and the monthly change in 
30-day primary commercial paper rate. As to the sensitivity to the annualized growth 
rate of money supply, healthy firms are more positively sensitive to it than distressed 
firms. 
    The  percentage  of  directors  and  supervisors controlled by the largest shareholder, 
management participation and pledge ratio are significantly higher for distressed firms 
than for healthy firms. For instance, 76% of the directors of the board are controlled 
by the largest shareholders of distressed firms, compared with only 55.7% for healthy 
                                                 
7  Accounting data for the year prior to the financial distress are used to compute the statistics. Since 
the financial reports are not released until April of the next year, it is possible that some firms have 
already fallen into financial distress before their financial reports are released. We did try to use the 
accounting data tow years prior to the financial distress, but corporate governance variables were 
difficult to collect in this case. 
8  For interest coverage, or times interest earned, the mean and standard deviation for healthy firms 
look awfully large. Upon double check, we find many healthy firms incur little interest expense, which 
results in high interest coverage. This in turn causes high standard deviation and low t-statistics. 
  12firms. Moreover, 75% of the supervisors of the distressed firms are affiliated with the 
largest shareholders, as opposed to 51% for healthy firms.   
    As to management participation, we see from Table 2 that in 70% of the 
distressed firms, the largest shareholders serve as the chairman and CEO at the same 
time. The percentage for healthy firms is only 47%. On average, large shareholders of 
distressed firms pledge 60% of the shares for bank loans while only 26% is pledged 
by the large shareholders of healthy firms. 
        These statistics show that the corporate governance structures of these two types 
of firms are quite different from each other. However, voting rights, cashflow rights, 
and the discrepancy between them do not significantly differ between these two 
groups. This suggests that board composition may play a more important role than 
ownership structure in explaining financial distress. 
2. The Empirical Findings 
    We use a stepwise regression model which combines forward selection and 
backward elimination for empirical purposes. The significance level for forward 
selection is set at 0.25 while is 0.30 for backward elimination. For accounting 
information, debt ratio, ROA, quick ratio and before tax profit margin are selected by 
the stepwise regression. For corporate governance variables, the percentage of 
directors (supervisors) affiliated with the largest shareholders, management 
participation, pledge ratio and cash flow right of the largest shareholders are selected 
by the stepwise regression as the most important explanatory variables. 
    Model I includes accounting variables alone. From Table 3, we see all the signs 
of the accounting variables are as expected, i.e., debt ratio has positive coefficient, 
implying higher probability of financial distress for firms with higher debt ratio, all 
  13the other three variables have negative signs, implying lower probability of financial 
failure for firms with higher ROA, quick ratio and before tax profit margin. However, 
quick ratio and before tax profit margin do not achieve the required significance level. 
Model II includes macroeconomic sensitivities in addition to accounting 
information as suggested by Tirapat and Nittayagasetwat (1999). Again all the signs 
of accounting variables are in line with our expectation. Similar to model I, only debt 
ratio and ROA are significant statistically. The only significant macroeconomic factor 
is the firm’s sensitivity to the growth rate of money supply (β4). The higher the firm’s 
sensitivity to the growth rate of money supply, the higher is the probability of the 
firm’s financial distress. As shown in Table2, the average sensitivity to money supply 
is positive (1.11) for distressed firms while is negative (-0.16) for healthy firms. 
Positive coefficient of β4 for model II implies that slowing down in money supply 
growth rate represents a bad signal for distressed firms which increases the probability 
of their falling into financial distress. Other macroeconomic sensitivities, however, 
either do not enter the regression at all or are insignificant in statistical sense. 
    M o d e l   III incorporates both accounting and corporate governance variables. The 
results of binary logistic regression model are in accordance with our expectation. 
From Table 3, again we see debt ratio and ROA have strong explanatory power 
(significant at 1% level). The most powerful corporate governance variables are the 
percentage of directors controlled by the largest shareholders (significant at 5% level), 
and pledge ratio (significant at 1% level). Management participation obtains weak 
support for being a negative factor toward financial healthiness (significant at 10% 
level). Cash flow right and the structure of supervisory board, though correct in sign, 
do not show explanatory power significantly. Thus the results show that the quality of 
corporate governance does contribute to the probability of financial distress. When the 
  14board of directors are effectively controlled by the largest shareholder, negative 
entrenchment effect or minority expropriation tends to be stronger, which in turn leads 
to higher probability of financial failure. Higher pledge ratio effectively lowers the 
cash flow right of the largest shareholder, in the sense that losses of the firms are 
shared by the banks (as the collaterals, i.e., the shares pledged will shrink in value) 
who provide credit to finance the shareholding. Thus, the probability of financial 
failure would be higher. Management participation weakens the monitoring function 
that the board of directors is supposed to have, and hence increases the probability of   
financial distress. 
Finally, Model Ⅳ further adds in macroeconomic sensitivity of firms to 
enhance the explanatory by running multinomial logistic regression. In this model, we 
select two accounting variables, debt ratio and ROA, two corporate governance 
variables, percentage of directors controlled by the largest shareholder and pledge 
ratio, as well as all five macroeconomic sensitivities for empirical purposes. The 
accounting and corporate governance variables are all significant at 1% level by Wald 
test as in Model I, Model II and Model III , and will not be discussed further. 
For macroeconomic sensitivities, firms with share returns more sensitive to 
growth rate in production index and money supply are more vulnerable to financial 
distress. Thus when the economy slows down or when the money supply grows at a 
slower pace, these firms are the first group to suffer. However, negative contribution 
of the sensitivity with respect to changes in CP interest rate to the probability of 
financial distress is hard to explain. At a first glance, it may imply that higher short 
term interest rate protects firms against financial distress, which sounds contradictory 
to common knowledge. But if we analyze further, we will see this is not necessary the 
case. Recall from Panel B of Table 2, β3, on average is positive (0.89) for healthy 
  15firms. In this case, the above argument may be acceptable, since healthy firms may be   
Table 3: Empirical results of the binary logistic models 
 Model  I  Model II  Model III  Model  Ⅳ 





























(0.643)   





(0.708)   
Cash flow right of the 
largest shareholder      -0.005 
(0.804)   
% of directors 
controlled by the 
largest shareholder 




% of supervisors 
controlled by the 
largest shareholder 
    0.007 




    0.676 
(0.100)*   




β1   0.704 
(0.315) 
  1.495 
(0.063)* 
β2    
  -0.203 
(0.145) 
β3    
  -0.226 
(0.003)*** 
β4   0.342 
(0.003)*** 
  0.318 
(0.004)*** 
β5   0.113 
(0.819) 
  0.197 
(0.726) 
(1) Numbers in parentheses are p-values 
(2)   *: significant at 10% , **: significant at 5% , ***: significant at 1% 
(3) β1: sensitivity to annualized growth rate of production index；β2: sensitivity to annualized growth 
rate of CPI；β3: sensitivity to 30 day CP interest rate; β4: sensitivity to money supply growth rate 
(M2); β5: sensitivity to general scoring of economic situation. 
  16able to reduce short term financing in a rising interest rate environment. On the other 
hand, β3 for distressed firms is negative (-0.53) on average. With negative coefficient 
of β3 in Model III, the probability of financial distress will be higher as a result of 
higher rate. 
3. Test of Goodness of Fit 
    Loglikelihood ratio test, Cox and Shell R
2  Nagelkerke R
2 and Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test are applied to test the goodness of fit of our models. The results are 
summarized in Table 4. 
    First of all, loglikelihood tests reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients are 
zero at 1% level, for all three models. Secondly, Cox and Shell R
2 is 0.212 for Model 
I. It increases to 0.239 when macroeconomic sensitivities are included (Model II). If 
corporate governance variables instead of macroeconomic sensitivities are 
incorporated, the R
2 further rises to 0.258 (Model III). This implies that corporate 
governance variables are more capable of explaining the probability of financial 
distress than macroeconomic sensitivities marginally. Higher Cox and Shell R
2 is 
achieved (0.288) when all three groups of variables enter into the model (Model Ⅳ), 
suggesting that each group of variables has its own merits in explaining the 
probability of financial distress. Similar results obtain with respect to Nagelkerke R
2. 
It increases from 0.423 for Model I, 0.476 for Model II, 0.514 for Model III to 0.573 
for Model  Ⅳ. 
    Finally, Hosmer and Lemeshow test is useful in testing the difference between 
model-predicted values and observed values. If the statistics is large enough to reject 
the null hypothesis that predicted values equal observed values, then the model may 
not be good enough. For our three models, none of them is rejected at 10% level. 
  17Therefore we can be confident about our models. 
Table 4: Results of the tests of goodness of fit 
Model  Log likelihood 






I  122.286 
(0.000)***  0.212 0.423  12.439 
(0.133) 
II  139.909 
(0.000)***  0.239 0.476  14.138 
(0.178) 
III  152.996 
(0.000)***  0.258 0.514 5.036 
(0.754) 
Ⅳ  173.805 
(0.000)***  0.288 0.573 3.933 
(0.863) 
(1) Numbers in parentheses are P-value 
(2) *: significant at 10% , **: significant at 5% , ***: significant at 1% 
 
IV. Prediction and Classification 
1. In-Sample Predication and Choice-Based Sample Bias 
    In this section, we assess how choice-based sample bias pointed out by 
Zmijewski (1984) affects the percentage of accurate classification. Existing literature 
usually employ 1:1 or 1:2 matching sample. In other words, for every financial 
distressed firm, one or two healthy firms are chosen as matching samples. In the real 
world, financially distressed firms are far less than one half or one third. Therefore 
these matching techniques may induce over-sampling of financially distressed firms, 
which in turn may artificially inflate the classification accuracy. 
     We apply 1:1 and 1:2 matching techniques as well as the entire sample (without 
matching) to compute the accuracy of classification. We first calculate the estimated 
probability of financial distress for each firm using the three fitted binary logistic 
regressing models. Under a cutoff rule of 0.5, i.e., firms with estimated probability 
greater than 0.5 are classified as financially distressed firms, we summarize the 
classification accuracy of all three models in Table 5. 
  18    It is obvious from Table 5 that the classification accuracy for financially 
distressed firms deteriorates when more healthy firms are mixed into the sample. For 
example, the classification accuracy for distressed firms in Model I drops from 77.2% 
and 61.4% down to 38.6% when 1:1, 1:2 matching sample and the entire sample are 
used respectively. On the other hand, the classification accuracy for healthy firms 
increases when the sample is enlarged. 
 
Table 5: Classification accuracy of the fitted models 
Models  Firms  1: 1 matching 1: 2 matching Entire sample
Healthy 82.5%  92.1%  98.9% 
Distressed  77.2 61.4 38.6  I 
All  79.8 81.9 92.2 
 Healthy  82.5 93.0 98.5 
II  Distressed  80.7 64.9 43.9 
  All  81.6 83.6 92.4 
Healthy  84.2 91.2 97.8 
Distressed  82.5 77.2 49.1  III 
All  83.3 86.5 92.4 
Healthy  89.5 93.9 97.8 
Distressed  86.0 77.2 61.4  Ⅳ 
All  87.7 88.3 93.8 
*Cutoff probability is set to be 0.5 
 
    No  matter  what  sampling  technique  is used, the classification accuracy increases 
when more variables are included in the fitted model. Take the entire sample as an 
example, the classification accuracy for distressed firms increases from 38.6% for 
Model I, 43.9% for Model II, 49.1% for Model III up to 61.4% for Model Ⅳ. This 
provides strong evidence to support the superiority of our integrated model, which 
integrates accounting, corporate governance and macroeconomic variables in it. 
  19    Moreover, the marginal benefit of our integrated model also increases with the 
sample size. For example, the prediction accuracy for distressed firms under 1:1 
matching principle gains 8.8% (from 77.2% in Model I to 86.0% in Model  Ⅳ), but it 
gains 22.8% when the entire sample is applied (from 38.6% in Model I to 61.4% in 
Model  Ⅳ). Thus the inclusion of corporate governance and macroeconomic variables 
in addition to accounting variables are especially beneficial in the entire-sample case. 
 
2. Out-Sample Prediction 
    For the purposes of obtaining more realistic and practical prediction, we use the 
samples of 1998 to 2000 to fit the estimated models, which are in turn applied to the 
samples of 2001. The resulting classification accuracies are tabulated in Table 6.   
    We see from Table 6 that the prediction accuracy for distressed firms increases 
from 30% for Model I, 60% for Model II, 40% for Model III, up to 80% for Model 
Ⅳ. Again we demonstrate better results of prediction with the proposed integrated 
model. 
 
Table 6: Out-sample prediction accuracy, 2001 




Whole sample   
(147 firms) 
I 98.54%  30%  93.88% 
II 96.35%  60%  93.88% 
III  96.35% 40% 92.52% 
Ⅳ  94.89% 80% 93.88% 
*cutoff probability is set to be 0.5. 
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3. The Choice of Cut-off Points 
    The predicted probability of financial distress for each firm in Model Ⅳ is 
calculated with the fitted logistic model using the samples from 1998 to 2001. The 
frequencies of the resulting probabilities are tabulated in Table 7 in which 
probabilities are categorized into five intervals of equal size.   
     We find 93.19% of healthy firms to have an estimated probability of financial 
distress below 0.1999, and 36.84% of distressed firms to have an estimated 
probability over 0.8000. The cumulative distributions for the two groups of firms can 
be seen from Figure 2 in which strong discriminating power is visualized. 
 
Table 7: The frequency distribution of the estimated probability of financial distress 
Probability 
Interval 
No. and % of 
healthy firms 











0-0.1999 424(93.19)* 11(19.30)  73.89%  93.19%  19.30% 
0.2000-0.3999 16(3.52)  5(8.77)  -5.26%  96.70%  28.07% 
0.4000-0.5999 12(2.64)  11(19.30)  -16.66%  99.34%  47.37% 
0.6000-0.7999 1(0.22)  9(15.79)  -15.57%  99.56%  63.16% 
0.8000-0.9999 2(0.44)  21(36.84)  -36.40%  100.00  100.00% 
Total 455(100.00)  57(100.00)  0.00     









0-19.99 20-39.99 40-59.99 60-79.99 80-99.99
Estimated probability of financial distress (%)
Cumulative
percentages
healthy firms distress firms
 
Figure2: The cumulative percentage of firms in all intervals of estimated 
probability of financial distress in the integrated prediction model. 
        The choice of cutoff point represents a trade-off between type I and type II error. 
If we maximize the sum of percentages of correct classification for the two groups of 
firms, the optimal cutoff point falls around 0.2000. In this case, the percentage of 
correct classification will be 93.19% for healthy firms and 80.70% for distressed firms. 
Thus we propose a cutoff point of 0.2000 whereas firms with estimated probability 
greater or equal to 0.2000 are classified as potential distressed firms, as shown in 
Table 8. 




Healthy  424 (93.19%)  31 (6.81%)  Actual 
outcome  Distressed  11 (19.30%)  46 (80.70%) 
    We then try out-sample prediction under the proposed cutoff scheme. Using 
  22samples between 1998 and 2000 to fit the integrated model and plugging in data of 
2001, we find 90% of distressed firms are accurately classified as such and 85.40% of 
healthy firms are predicted as healthy with our model. In other words, nine out of ten 
financially distressed firms in year 2001 are accurately predicted to be so using an 
integrated model built upon samples between 1998 and 2000. 
V.  Conclusions 
    We integrated accounting, corporate governance, and macroeconomic variables 
to build up a binary logistic regression model for the prediction of financially 
distressed firms. Debt ratio and ROA are found to be the most explanatory accounting 
variables while the percentage of directors controlled by the largest shareholder 
(which measures negative entrenchment effect), management participation, and the 
percentage of shares pledged for loans by large shareholders are shown to have 
positive contribution to the probability of financial distress. For macroeconomic 
sensitivities, firms with higher sensitivities to the annualized growth rates of 
manufacturing production index and money supply (M2) are more vulnerable to   
financial distress. 
    On the issue of sampling technique, we find that oversampling of distressed 
firms is subject to the problem of choice-based sample bias pointed out by Zmijewski 
(1984). The classification accuracy is overstated consequently. To tackle the problem, 
we try to include as many healthy firms as possible in our sample instead of following 
the traditional 1: 1 or 1: 2 matching principle. The results show that the classification 
accuracy is mostly significantly improved in our integrated prediction model when the 
sample is closest to the actual population. 
    For the trade-off between type I and type II errors in the predicted probability 
classification, we maximize the sum of classification accuracy for both groups of 
  23firms (the healthy and the distressed). It is found that an estimated probability of 
financial distress of 0.2000 represents the optimal cutoff point for predicting financial 
distress. Under such a cutoff scheme, our integrated model produces an in-sample 
classification accuracy of 80.7% for distressed firms and 93.2% for healthy firms. For 
out-sample prediction, 90% of the distressed firms and 85.4% healthy firms in 2001 
are correctly identified using an integrated model built upon samples from 1998 to   
2000.  
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